The other beginning of Modernity. Hegel Interpreter of Locke
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4454/sl.6-1293Keywords:
Hegel, Locke, Empiricism, Experience, SubstanceAbstract
The essay examines Hegel's interpretation of John Locke's thought. Initially, it reconstructs Hegel’s relationship with empiricism, a dialogue that spans his entire philosophical production, from Faith and Knowledge (1802) to the Berlin editions of the Encyclopedia. While in Jena, empiricism is regarded as a theoretical paradigm opposed to speculative reason – one that negatively influences modern philosophy of reflection as developed by Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte – starting with the Phenomenology, this devaluation of empiricism is partially mitigated, due to the growing importance of the theme of experience. Only in the Berlin editions of the Encyclopedia does Hegel fully acknowledge the philosophical value of empiricism, emphasizing how this modern philosophical current has succeeded in elevating thought to the supreme dimensions of actuality (Wirklichkeit) and freedom.
In the final phase of Hegel’s thought, criticisms of empiricism do not entirely disappear, but they take on the form of an immanent critique, aiming to enhance the thematic core of experience beyond the intellectualist method adopted by empiricism. Finally, the essay reconstructs Hegel’s reading of Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, highlighting both Hegel’s positive assessments and his sources of dissatisfaction. It also examines Hegel’s treatment of Locke in the Phenomenology of Spirit, showing how he appropriates Locke’s critique of the idea of substance, incorporating it as a fundamental element of his own philosophical project.