Abstract
This essay examines the complex relationship between psychoanalysis and law, beginning with Jean Laplanche's reflections on the epistemological limits of psychoanalysis in the juridical field. This article analyzes the crucial tension between the conception of the subject as a product of signifying alienation to the Other and the question of subjective responsibility, highlighting how this tension permeates both psychoanalytic theory and juridical practice. The text critically addresses the "melodramatic" drift of contemporaneity, which replaces the tragic awareness of the human condition with a victimizing and justificatory posture, exempting the subject from responsibility for their acts. Through a dialogue with philosophical tradition and Alenka Zupančič's thought, the author proposes a reinterpretation of the concept of freedom: not as the absence of constraints, but as awareness of one's own limitation, which paradoxically constitutes the very condition of responsibility. The essay concludes with a differential analysis of the possibilities for subjective rectification in relation to different clinical structures (neurosis, psychosis, perversion), emphasizing how psychoanalysis's specific contribution to law lies in recognizing the subject's responsibility for their unconscious and in promoting an ethics of consequences.