Principles and methods of internalist philosophy of law

Abstract

Taking the lead from Vito Velluzzi’s Metodologia e diritto civile. Una prospettiva filosofica (Methodology and Civil Law. A Philosophical Perspective), the paper casts light upon the peculiar way of conceiving legal philosophy Velluzzi adopts and puts to work in his book: namely, the “internalist conception”, corresponding to the variety of “internalist jurisprudence” (as I propose to call it). Originally inaugurated by Letizia Gianformaggio (1944-2004), a leading Italian legal philosopher, internalist jurisprudence characterizes for requiring legal philosophy to be an intellectual enterprise carried out not outside of, or side by side to, the doctrinal approach to law by jurists and judges, but, rather, inside of their knowing and acting. The legal philosopher must become a philosopher-jurist (in this wide sense of “jurist”), or else be no-legal philosopher at all. According to internalist jurisprudence’s principles, this requires legal philosophers dealing with the same law jurists deal with (positive law), coping with the same problems jurists face in their everyday practice, providing jurists with the ever refined tools needed for better performing their tasks (in a more rational and justice-oriented way), and, not the least, taking part to juristic disputes, in order to break new paths, support, and, if necessary, replace and correct them. After casting light on these principles (§ 1), the paper reviews the relations between internalist jurisprudence and the metadoctrinal enterprise Bobbio called “metagiurisprudenza” (§ 2) and offers, finally, a reconstruction of the method of internalist jurisprudence Velluzzi adopts (§ 3).