Anger of the masses and anger of individuals: analyzing and comparing Thucydides and Xenophon

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Abstract: In Thucydides the angry reaction of collectivities of citizens and soldiers is frequently emphasised and in the speeches characters often argue about the danger of decisions taken under the influence of anger. Thucydides' attention to the psychology of the masses is also important in relation to his overall plan of analysing events that may occur in compliance to the human nature (1.22.4: κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον). In Xenophon there is no lack of angry collectivities but the focus is mainly on emotions of the individuals coming to decisions in a state of anger and thus suffering the consequences. An exemplary case is that of Cyaxares in the *Cyropaedia*, proposed by Xenophon as a negative paradigm and compared with the exemplary behaviour of Cyrus the Great. Rather than the control of the masses – a typical concern of Thucydides – Xenophon focuses on the education, character and behaviour of those in power.

Keywords: Thucydides – Xenophon – anger – psychology of the masses – emotions

1. Thucydides: anger of masses

Reviewing Eirene Visvardi's book, *Emotion in Action. Thucydides and the Tragic Chorus*, Tim Rood described the growing interest in the subject of emotions as an «emotional turn».[1] Among the emotions investigated, a special place belongs to anger: suffice only to mention William Harris' pioneering book *Restraining Rage*,[2] that inaugurated this trend in studies. The aim of my paper is to examine the occurrences of some of the terms indicating anger in Thucydides and Xenophon in order to understand where the interest of the two historians lies and if it is possible to detect an evolution in their psychological analysis of the masses and individuals.

A first investigation on the use of the term ὀργή[3] and the verb ὀργίζομαι in Thucydides, to which one should add περιοργής[4] and χαλεπαίνω, clearly shows that anger is attributed mainly to the collectivity of citizens or soldiers.[5] In some

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[1] Visvardi 2015; Rood 2016.

[2] Harris 2001.

[3] According to Bruno Sunseri 2011, 32, ὀργή is the word used to indicate an emotional state.

[4] The word is used only once in Thucydides: see 4.130.4 and Huart 1968, 162.

[5] See Huart 1968, 158-159: anger rarely appears in statesmen and is an absent feeling in Pericles. See also Harris 2001, 180: «Thucydides rarely attributes *orgē* to Greek political leaders, who from time to time are seen calming the angry *demos*».

cases, despite the reference to the Persians, Athenians or Spartans, it can be assumed that the rulers of cities or kingdoms, such as the Persian Tissaphernes, are those who felt anger and made decisions prompted by this feeling. In 1.26.3 the verb χαλεπαίνω indicates the irritation of the Corcyreans because Epidamnus had relied on the Corinthians. By contrast, in 1.31.1 (ὀργῇ φέροντες) and in 1.38.5 (τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὀργῇ), the Corinthians are angry with the Corcyreans in turn. In a direct speech of Pericles, he states that the Athenians must not let themselves be angered and agree to clash with the Spartans in land battles (1.143.5): καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι («We should not under any irritation at the loss of our property give battle to the Peloponnesians, who far outnumber us»).[6]

In 2.8.5 it is the Greeks who are angry with the Athenians (<ἐν> ὀργῇ εἶχον). Again in 2.18.5 the army is angry with Archidamus for the duration of the siege (ἐν τοιαύτῃ μὲν ὀργῇ ὁ στρατὸς τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐν τῇ καθέδρᾳ εἶχεν) and in 2.21.3 the Athenians are enraged with Pericles (ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον) because he does not organise a sortie to counter the invasion by the Spartan army. In 2.22.1 Pericles fears that the Athenians will make some mistake driven by anger:[7]

> Περικλῆς δὲ ὁρῶν μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ οὐ τὰ ἄριστα φρονοῦντας, πιστεύων δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξιέναι, ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα, τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν, τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι᾽ ἡσυχίας μάλιστα ὅσον ἐδύνατο εἶχεν.
>
> But he, seeing that they were overcome by the irritation of the moment and inclined to evil counsels, and confident that he was right in refusing to go out, would not summon an assembly or meeting of any kind, lest, coming together more in anger than in prudence, they might take some false step. He maintained a strict watch over the city, and sought to calm the irritation as far as he could.

The anger of the Athenians against Pericles recurs again both in direct speech (2.60.1, where ὀργή is joined to χαλεπαίνω; 2.64.1: μήτε ἐμὲ δι᾽ ὀργῆς ἔχετε; compare 2.60.5, with the verbal form ὀργίζεσθε) as well as later in the famous judgment on Pericles (2. 65.1 and 3).[8] In the introduction to the speech, Thucydides explains the reasons that had prompted Pericles to intervene (2.59.3):

> ὁ δὲ ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὰ παρόντα χαλεπαίνοντας καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντας ἅπερ αὐτὸς ἤλπιζε, ξύλλογον ποιήσας (ἔτι δ᾽ ἐστρατήγει) ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναί τε καὶ

[6] The translations of Thucydides are by Benjamin Jowett.

[7] The passage is emphasized by Huart 1968, 56-57, who highlights the contrast between ὀργή and γνώμη (see also p. 162). On the different meanings of *gnome* in Thucydides' time see Huart 1973. On Pericles' ability to control the emotions of the *demos* see Visvardi 2015, 56-62.

[8] See Reeve 1999, 443-444.

> ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης πρὸς τὸ ἠπιώτερον καὶ ἀδεέστερον καταστῆσαι.
>
> He saw that they were exasperated by their misery and were behaving just as he had always anticipated that they would. And so, being still general, he called an assembly, wanting to encourage them and to convert their angry feelings into a gentler and more hopeful mood.

Especially noteworthy in this passage is the beautiful abstract τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης.

Again, the Spartans are annoyed with Cnemus (2.85.2: ὀργῇ οὖν ἀπέστελλον) and the Athenians feel the same towards the Mytilenians who have defected (3.36.2: ὑπὸ ὀργῆς) and, for the same reason, also towards the inhabitants of Mende (4.123.3: ὀργισθέντες). The Peloponnesian soldiers are irritated by the hasty retreat of the Macedonians (4.128.4: ὀργιζόμενοι).[9] The Spartan ambassadors fear that the angry Athenians (5.44.3: ὀργιζόμενοι) will conclude an alliance with Argos. Other cases in which an entire city is in the grip of anger are those of the Mantineans in 5.29.2 (δι' ὀργῆς ἔχοντες) and of the Athenians in 5.46.5 (δι' ὀργῆς εἶχον). The Eleians are irritated because the allies have not accepted their proposal to march on Lepreum (5.62.2: ὀργισθέντες) and the Spartans are angry in 5.63.2 at the news of the taking of Orchomenus (ἐχαλέπαινον). The Athenians are wrathful when they suspect the emergence of an oligarchic and tyrannical conspiracy (6.60.2: ὀργιζομένων). After the Sicilian defeat, the Athenians are angry with the soothsayers who had raised the hope of conquering Sicily (8.1.1: ὠργίζοντο). Again, the Athenians show feelings of anger when they believe to have been deceived by Alcibiades in 8.56.4: ἀλλ' ἄπορα νομίσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐξηπατῆσθαι, δι' ὀργῆς ἀπελθόντες κομίζονται ἐς τὴν Σάμον («the Athenians now perceived that matters were hopeless, and that they had been duped by Alcibiades. So, they departed in anger to Samos»). Again, the Athenians of Samos behave acrimoniously (8.86.4: ἐχαλέπαινον; 5: ὀργιζομένους) towards the delegates of the Four Hundred and Alcibiades manages to appease the crowd.

One particularly significant passage, which I have isolated from the others because of its importance, is detected in the section on the *stasis* of Corcyra. The description of the anger of the citizens of Corcyra is a full-blown analysis of how the violence of the passions disrupts civil life (3.84.1-2):[10]

> ἐν δ' οὖν τῇ Κερκύρᾳ τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν προυτολμήθη, καὶ ὁπόσα ὕβρει μὲν ἀρχόμενοι τὸ πλέον ἢ σωφροσύνῃ ὑπὸ τῶν τὴν τιμωρίαν παρασχόντων οἱ ἀνταμυνόμενοι

[9] See Bruno Sunseri 2011, 28.

[10] This chapter is considered inauthentic by many scholars: see Hornblower 1991, 488-489, but I do not think that either the evidence of the scholiast or the silence of Dionysius of Halicarnassus are sufficiently strong arguments. See also Harris 2001, 178-179.

δράσειαν, πενίας δὲ τῆς ἀπαλλαξείοντές τινες, μάλιστα δ' ἂν διὰ πάθους, ἐπιθυμοῦντες τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔχειν, παρὰ δίκην γιγνώσκοιεν, οἵ τε μὴ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, ἀπὸ ἴσου δὲ μάλιστα ἐπιόντες ἀπαιδευσίᾳ ὀργῆς πλεῖστον ἐκφερόμενοι ὠμῶς καὶ ἀπαραιτήτως ἐπέλθοιεν. [2] ξυνταραχθέντος τε τοῦ βίου ἐς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον τῇ πόλει καὶ τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις, εἰωθυῖα καὶ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἀδικεῖν, ἀσμένη ἐδήλωσεν ἀκρατὴς μὲν ὀργῆς οὖσα, κρείσσων δὲ τοῦ δικαίου, πολεμία δὲ τοῦ προύχοντος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦ τε ὁσίου τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι προυτίθεσαν τοῦ τε μὴ ἀδικεῖν τὸ κερδαίνειν, ἐν ᾧ μὴ βλάπτουσαν ἰσχὺν εἶχε τὸ φθονεῖν.

Now in Corcyra most of these deeds were perpetrated, and for the first time. There was every crime which men could commit in revenge who had been governed not wisely, but tyrannically, and now had the oppressor at their mercy. There were the dishonest designs of others who were longing to be relieved from their habitual poverty, and were naturally animated by a passionate desire for their neighbour's goods; and there were crimes of another class which men commit, not from covetousness, but from the enmity which equals foster towards one another until they are carried away by their blind rage into the extremes of pitiless cruelty. [2] At such a time the life of the city was all in disorder, and human nature, which is always ready to transgress the laws, having now trampled them under foot, delighted to show that her passions were ungovernable, that she was stronger than justice, and the enemy of everything above her. If malignity had not exercised a fatal power, how could anyone have preferred revenge to piety, and gain to innocence?

The *stasis* of Corcyra is a powerful paradigm, as it also emerges from Thucydides' comment (3.85.1): οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἐς ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, «Such were the passions which the citizens of Corcyra first of all Hellenes displayed towards one another». To these passages one should add 3.82.5, where the word used is χαλεπαίνω: καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ' ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὕποπτος. Again, these are considerations on the psychology of the masses[11] applied to the specific case of *stasis*.

2. Anger on the battlefield

An interesting case is the one about the different way of approaching the battlefield by the Argives and Spartans (5.70):

καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ ξύνοδος ἦν, Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ[12] χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν ὁμοῦ ἐγκαθεστώτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ὁμαλῶς μετὰ ῥυθμοῦ βαίνοντες προσέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθείη αὐτοῖς ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.

[11] On some aspects of the psychology of the masses in Thucydides, compared with Gorgias, see Hunter 1986.

[12] Huart 1968, 157, is tempted to translate as «élan». According to Hornblower 2008, 185, the word implies disapproval.

> At length the two armies went forward. The Argives and their allies advanced to the charge with great fury and determination. The Lacedaemonians moved slowly and to the music of many flute-players, who were stationed in their ranks, and played, not as an act of religion, but in order that the army might march evenly and in true measure, and that the line might not break, as often happens in great armies when they go into battle.

In 2.11.4 it is Archidamus who explains that attacks conducted in anger can be repulsed by lesser armies:[13]

> ἄδηλα γὰρ τὰ τῶν πολέμων, καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου τὰ πολλὰ καὶ δι᾽ ὀργῆς αἱ ἐπιχειρήσεις γίγνονται· πολλάκις τε τὸ ἔλασσον πλῆθος δεδιὸς ἄμεινον ἠμύνατο τοὺς πλέονας διὰ τὸ καταφρονοῦντας ἀπαρασκεύους γενέσθαι.
>
> War is carried on in the dark; attacks are generally sudden and furious, and often the smaller army, animated by a proper fear, has been more than a match for a larger force which, disdaining their opponent, were taken unprepared by him.

This passage can be compared *per contrarium* to the exhortation speech delivered by Gilippus to the troops (7.68.1):

> πρὸς οὖν ἀταξίαν τε τοιαύτην καὶ τύχην ἀνδρῶν ἑαυτὴν παραδεδωκυῖαν πολεμιωτάτων ὀργῇ προσμείξωμεν, καὶ νομίσωμεν ἅμα μὲν νομιμώτατον εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους οἳ ἂν ὡς ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ τοῦ προσπεσόντος δικαιώσωσιν ἀποπλῆσαι τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, ἅμα δὲ ἐχθροὺς ἀμύνασθαι ἐκγενησόμενον ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενόν που ἥδιστον εἶναι.
>
> Against such disorder, and against hateful enemies whose good fortune has run away from them to us, let us advance with fury. We should remember in the first place that men are doing a most lawful act when they take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggressor, and that they have a right to satiate their heart's animosity; secondly, that this vengeance, which is proverbially the sweetest of all things, will soon be within our grasp.

It should be pointed out the wording τῆς γνώμης τὸ θυμούμενον, which is quite similar to τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης of 2.59.3. These are typical Thucydidean clues proving again that the direct speeches were composed by Thucydides and are not neutral, let alone literal, accounts of what was really said. In this phrase we also meet one more crucial term for anger, namely the verb θυμόω. The verb is used by Thucydides only in this passage, whereas the noun θυμός appears three times: in 1.49.3, ἀλλὰ θυμῷ καὶ ῥώμῃ τὸ πλέον ἐναυμάχουν ἢ

[13] The passage is quoted by Desmond 2006, 376, among the examples of how the psychology of masses and armies is analysed in Thucydides.

ἐπιστήμῃ, where it is translated by Benjamin Jowett as «rage»; 2.11.7, quoted below, where it is translated as «angry»; 5.80.2, καὶ τά τε ἄλλα θυμῷ ἔφερον, translated «they were very energetic in all their doings».

3. Controlling anger in social life (and in relations with allies): an Athenian prerogative

To the passages on the anger of masses of citizens and armies one can compare the famous definition in Pericles' epitaph of the Athenians' way of life and their social relations, which describes, by means of a lithote, the Athenians' ability to remain calm in the face of their neighbours' actions (2.37.2):[14]

> ἐλευθέρως δὲ τά τε πρὸς κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ' ἡδονήν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μέν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὄψει ἀχθηδόνας προστιθέμενοι.
>
> There is no exclusiveness in our public life, and in our private intercourse we are not suspicious of one another, nor angry with our neighbour if he does what he likes; we do not put on sour looks at him which, though harmless, are not pleasant.

This formulation is part of the group of statements aimed at outlining the perfect city: this is the Periclean propaganda filtered through Thucydides.

The peculiarity of the Athenians is also emphasised in another speech, in which the Athenian ambassadors recall what happened during the battle of Salamis (1.74.2):

> προθυμίαν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τολμηροτάτην ἐδείξαμεν, οἵ γε, ἐπειδὴ ἡμῖν κατὰ γῆν οὐδεὶς ἐβοήθει, τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη μέχρι ἡμῶν δουλευόντων ἠξιώσαμεν ἐκλιπόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα διαφθείραντες μηδ' ὡς τὸ τῶν περιλοίπων ξυμμάχων κοινὸν προλιπεῖν μηδὲ σκεδασθέντες ἀχρεῖοι αὐτοῖς γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰς ναῦς κινδυνεῦσαι καὶ μὴ ὀργισθῆναι ὅτι ἡμῖν οὐ προυτιμωρήσατε.
>
> Thirdly, we displayed the most extraordinary courage and devotion; there was no one to help us by land; for up to our frontier those who lay in the enemy's path were already slaves; so we determined to leave our city and sacrifice our homes. Even in that extremity we did not choose to desert the cause of the allies who still resisted, or by dispersing ourselves to become useless to them; but we embarked and fought, taking no offence at your failure to assist us sooner.

Here too Thucydides has the Athenians deliver a self-eulogy, reminiscent in content and tone of the *epitaphioi logoi*. Of course, the Salamis paradigm is shaped according to the argumentation of the ambassadors' speech.

[14] See Harris 2001, 178.

4. Reflections on anger in direct speech: the psychology of the masses as a topic

In some direct speeches, the orators offer general considerations about the anger that often drives men to wrong choices or that lead to unsuccessful outcomes of military actions. This is the case in four famous speeches, by Pericles, Archidamus, Cleon, and Diodotus, respectively:

1.140.1 (Pericles)
τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι, μὴ εἴκειν Πελοποννησίοις, καίπερ εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ γνώμας τρεπομένους.

Athenians, I say, as I always have said, that we must never yield to the Peloponnesians, although I know that men are persuaded to go to war in one temper of mind, and act when the time comes in another, and that their resolutions change with the changes of fortune.

2.11.7 (Archidamus)
πᾶσι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ ἐν τῷ παραυτίκα ὁρᾶν πάσχοντάς τι ἄηθες ὀργὴ προσπίπτει· καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται.

For all men are angry when they not only suffer but see, and some strange form of calamity strikes full upon the eye; the less they reflect the more ready they are to fight.

3.38.1 (Cleon)
ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον ἀντίπαλον ὂν μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνει.

For after a time the anger of the sufferer waxes dulls, and he pursues the offender with less keenness; but the vengeance which follows closest upon the wrong is most adequate to it and exacts the fullest retribution.

3.42.1 (Diodotus)
νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλίᾳ εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν, ὧν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης.

In my opinion the two things most adverse to good counsel are haste and passion; the former is generally a mark of folly, the latter of vulgarity and narrowness of mind.

3.45.4 (Diodotus)
ἢ τοίνυν δεινότερόν τι τούτου δέος εὑρετέον ἐστὶν ἢ τόδε γε οὐδὲν ἐπίσχει, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκῃ τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ

φρονήματι, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων[15] ὡς ἑκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ' ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος ἐξάγουσιν ἐς κινδύνους.

And still there are transgressors. Some greater terror then has yet to be discovered; certainly death is no deterrent. For poverty inspires necessity with daring; and wealth engenders avarice in pride and insolence; and the various conditions of human life, as they severally fall under the sway of some mighty and fatal power, lure men through their passions to destruction.

These *gnomai*, which are part of the argumentative strategies that Thucydides makes his characters use, also testify to his attention to collective behaviour and psychology, which are crucial for making the right political decisions. The fact that arguments about collective psychology recur in narrative sections and direct speeches suggests, on the one hand, that these are themes widely used by orators and, on the other hand, that Thucydides was particularly sensitive and interested in these aspects.

To these passages one can compare the *exordium* of the speech of the ambassadors from Corcyra to Athens (1.32.1). They discuss about what those who have no claims to credit, and no bonds of alliance have to prove and state that what they ask for is useful or at least not harmful and that they will show gratitude. And they continue: εἰ δὲ τούτων μηδὲν σαφὲς καταστήσουσι, μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢν ἀτυχῶσιν («If they fulfil neither requirement they have no right to complain of a refusal»). In another ambassadorial speech the Athenians utter a *gnome* in turn (1.77.4): ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι («Mankind resent injustice more than violence, because the one seems to be an unfair advantage taken by an equal, the other is the irresistible force of a superior»).

5. The anger of individuals

The first passage in which the term ὀργή is used in reference to an individual is 1.130.2, on the harsh character of Pausanias:

δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὐτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ τῇ ὀργῇ οὕτω χαλεπῇ ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι· δι' ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἥκιστα ἡ ξυμμαχία μετέστη.

[15] According to Huart 1968, 156, in this and other passages ὀργή retains the sense of «humeurs, passion», in this case of «passions humaines». Other passages where this occurs, again according to Huart, are 2.82.2 (ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ); 5.70.1 (see above); 6.17.1 (see below); 1.140.1 (see above). To this meaning Huart 1968, 162, also traces the adverb εὐοργήτως in 1.122.1. In my opinion such a distinction between the meaning of 'anger' and 'passion' reflects our categories more than the ancient ones.

> He made himself difficult of access, and displayed such a violent temper towards everybody that no one could come near him; and this was one of the chief reasons why the confederacy transferred themselves to the Athenians.

In 6.17.1, the speech by Alcibiades, in the *Redetrias* that precedes the Sicilian expedition, employs the classical *topos* of youth:

> καὶ ταῦτα ἡ ἐμὴ νεότης καὶ ἄνοια παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι ἐς τὴν Πελοποννησίων δύναμιν λόγοις τε πρέπουσιν ὡμίλησε καὶ ὀργῇ πίστιν παρασχομένη ἔπεισεν.

> These were the achievements of my youth, and of what is supposed to be my monstrous folly; thus did I by winning words conciliate the Peloponnesian powers, and my heartiness made them believe in me and follow me.

The famous passage on the assassination of Hipparchus (6.57.3) refers to the passion – in this case love – of an individual:[16]

> τὸν λυπήσαντα οὖν σφᾶς καὶ δι' ὅπερ πάντα ἐκινδύνευον ἐβούλοντο πρότερον, εἰ δύναιντο, προτιμωρήσασθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ εἶχον ὥρμησαν ἔσω πυλῶν, καὶ περιέτυχον τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ παρὰ τὸ Λεωκόρειον καλούμενον, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπερισκέπτως προσπεσόντες καὶ ὡς ἂν μάλιστα δι' ὀργῆς ὁ μὲν ἐρωτικῆς, ὁ δὲ ὑβρισμένος, ἔτυπτον καὶ αὐτόν.

> Whereupon they determined to take their revenge first on the man who had outraged them and was the cause of their desperate attempt. So they rushed, just as they were, within the gates. They found Hipparchus near the Leocorium, as it was called, and then and there falling upon him with all the blind fury, one of an injured lover, the other of a man smarting under an insult, they smote and slew him.

The Persian Tissaphernes is also in the grip of anger in 8.43.4:

> τέρας οὖν ἐκέλευε βελτίους σπένδεσθαι, ἢ ταύταις γε οὐ χρήσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἐπὶ τούτοις δεῖσθαι οὐδέν. ἀγανακτῶν δὲ ὁ μὲν Τισσαφέρνης ἀπεχώρησεν ἀπ' αὐτῶν δι' ὀργῆς καὶ ἄπρακτος κτλ.

> So he desired them to conclude some more satisfactory treaty, for he would have nothing to say to these; he did not want to have the fleet maintained upon any such terms. Tissaphernes was indignant, and without settling anything went away in a rage.

[16] On the context of the passage see Meyer 2008, especially 22, with the comparison between the Athenians' behaviour towards Alcibiades and the description of the lack of suspicion in social relations in 2.37.2.

The verb ὀργίζομαι recurs in a passage in which Pausanias is again involved, but in this case it is he who asks his interlocutor not to become angry (1.133): κἀκείνου αὐτά τε ταῦτα ξυνομολογοῦντος καὶ περὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἐῶντος ὀργίζεσθαι («And there was Pausanias, admitting the truth of his words, and telling him not to be angry at what had happened»). The same verb is found with reference to Theramenes in an interesting passage, also for the connection with χαλεπαίνω (8.92.9):

> καὶ ὁ μὲν Θηραμένης ἐλθὼν ἐς τὸν Πειραιᾶ (ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς στρατηγός), ὅσον καὶ ἀπὸ βοῆς ἕνεκα, ὠργίζετο τοῖς ὁπλίταις· ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχος καὶ οἱ ἐναντίοι τῷ ἀληθεῖ ἐχαλέπαινον.
>
> Theramenes, who was himself a general, came to the Piraeus, and in an angry voice pretended to rate the soldiers, while Aristarchus and the party opposed to the people were furious.

I have left for last a passage of controversial exegesis, Thuc. 2.65.8: ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργήν τι ἀντειπεῖν («on the strength of his own high character, could venture to oppose and even to anger them»). The widespread interpretation, to which Jowett's translation refers, is opposed by William Harris, according to whom «the latter's [i.e. Pericles'] authority with the Athenians was so great that he could even speak to them angrily (*pros orgēn*) that is to say without suffering for it».[17]

6. The verb ὀργάω

The verb ὀργάω appears in two Thucydidean passages in which it has a meaning akin to ὀργίζομαι. Both verbs are connected with ὀργή, but ὀργάω also develops other meanings than «to be angry», namely «to be excited», «to be swollen», and thus, to be ready to produce, «to desire»:[18]

> 4.108.6: τὸδὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ἐν τῷ αὐτίκα καὶ ὅτι τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων ὀργώντων ἔμελλον πειράσεσθαι, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἦσαν.
>
> Above all, they were influenced by the pleasurable excitement of the moment; they were now for the first time going to find out of what the Lacedaemonians were capable when in real earnest, and therefore they were willing to risk anything.
>
> 8.2.2: μάλιστα δὲ οἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἀφίστασθαι διὰ τὸ ὀργῶντες κρίνειν τὰ πράγματα καὶ μηδ' ὑπολείπειν λόγον αὐτοῖς ὡς τό γ' ἐπιὸν θέρος οἷοί τ' ἔσονται περιγενέσθαι.

[17] Harris 2001, 180.

[18] Huart 1968, 155-156, connects the verb to cases where ὀργή means 'dispositions passionelles, humeur'.

> But none showed greater alacrity than the subjects of the Athenians, who were everywhere willing even beyond their power to revolt; for they judged by their excited feelings, and would not admit a possibility that the Athenians could survive another summer.

To these passages one could add 2.21.3, where the majority of editors prefers to read ὥρμητο instead of ὤργητο.

7. Xenophon: anger and the management of power

In Xenophon there is no lack of angry communities, but there are some paradigmatic characters who experience this feeling and cannot control themselves, such as Clearchus in the *Anabasis* and Cyaxares in the *Cyropaedia*.[19]

Unlike Cyrus in the *Cyropaedia* and Xenophon character of the *Anabasis*, Clearchus has many qualities although is not an ideal commander (*An.* 2.6.9):

> τοῦτο δ' ἐποίει ἐκ τοῦ χαλεπὸς εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾶν στυγνὸς ἦν καὶ τῇ φωνῇ τραχύς, ἐκόλαζέ τε ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ ὀργῇ ἐνίοτε, ὡς καὶ αὐτῷ μεταμέλειν ἔσθ' ὅτε.

> This result he accomplished by being severe; for he was gloomy in appearance and harsh in voice, and he used to punish severely, sometimes in anger, so that on occasion he would be sorry afterwards (trans. by C.L. Brownson).

The passage is also interesting from a terminological point of view, because, next to the ὀργή, it presents the adjective χαλεπός, another term, which has the same root as χαλεπαίνω, related to the sphere of character and harshness. The action of Clearchus as commander confirms the limits of a leader who does not know how to control his anger and who is effective only in dangerous situations, while he appears inadequate in the daily management of the army.

In the *Cyropaedia* the only two occurrences of ὀργή are referred to Cyaxares: 4.5.18 (ἐκ τούτου δὲ καὶ τοὺς Μήδους ἐκάλει, καὶ ἅμα ὁ παρὰ τοῦ Κυαξάρου ἄγγελος παρίσταται, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τήν τε πρὸς Κῦρον ὀργὴν καὶ τὰς Μήδους ἀπειλὰς αὐτοῦ ἔλεγε, «After this he called in the Medes also and at the same moment the messenger from Cyaxares presented himself and in the presence of all reported his king's anger against Cyrus and his threats against the Medes», trans. by W. Miller); 4.5.21 (καὶ ἡ ὀργὴ οὖν αὕτη σάφ' οἶδα ὑπό τε τῶν ἀγαθῶν πεπανθήσεται καὶ σὺν τῷ φόβῳ λήγοντι ἄπεισι, «This wrath, therefore, I am quite sure, will be assuaged by our successes and will be gone with the passing of his fear», trans. by W. Miller). In the second passage it is Cyrus who speaks.

[19] In this section I will not examine all the passages, for which I refer to Tuci 2019 and Nicolai, currently in press, but only the most significant ones in order to highlight the differences between Thucydides and Xenophon. In particular, I will not mention passages in which groups of citizens or soldiers are angry.

Let us now turn to the verb ὀργίζομαι. Again, Cyaxares lets himself be carried away by anger in 4.5.12, a passage from which the violent character of Cyaxares emerges:

> ἀκούσας δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Κυαξάρης πολὺ μᾶλλον ἔτι τῷ Κύρῳ ὠργίζετο τῷ μηδ' εἰπεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα, καὶ πολλῇ σπουδῇ ἔπεμπεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Μήδους, ὡς ψιλώσων αὐτόν, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἔτι ἢ πρόσθεν τοῖς Μήδοις ἀπειλῶν ἀπεκάλει, καὶ τῷ πεμπομένῳ δὲ ἠπείλει, μὴ ἰσχυρῶς ταῦτα ἀπαγγέλλοι.
>
> Upon hearing this, Cyaxares was much more angry than ever with Cyrus for not even having told him that, and he sent off in greater haste to recall the Medes, for he hoped to strip him of his forces; and with even more violent threats than before, he ordered the Medes to return. And he threatened the messenger also if he did not deliver his message in all its emphasis (trans. by W. Miller).

In 5.4.35 it is Gadata who speaks to Cyrus:

> τάχ' οὖν εἴποι τις ἄν· καὶ τί δῆτα οὐχ οὕτως ἐνενοοῦ πρὶν ἀποστῆναι; ὅτι, ὦ Κῦρε, ἡ ψυχή μου διὰ τὸ ὑβρίσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι οὐ τὸ ἀσφαλέστατον σκοποῦσα διῆγεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῦτο κυοῦσ', ἆρά ποτ' ἔσται ἀποτείσασθαι τὸν καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἀνθρώποις, ὃς διατελεῖ μισῶν, οὐκ ἴσον τίς τι αὐτὸν ἀδικῇ, ἀλλ' ἐάν τινα ὑποπτεύσῃ βελτίονα αὑτοῦ εἶναι.
>
> Perhaps, then, some one might say: «And why, pray, did you not think of that before you revolted?». Because, Cyrus, on account of the outrage I had suffered and my consequent resentment, my soul was not looking out consistently for the safest course but was pregnant with this thought, whether it would ever be in my power to get revenge upon that enemy of gods and men, who cherishes an implacable hatred not so much toward the man who does him wrong as toward the one whom he suspects of being better than himself (trans. by W. Miller).

The association with ὑβρίσθαι suggests that the anger is interwoven with violence or bullying. Again, Cyaxares is angry with Cyrus in 5.5.8, in a passage that deserves to be quoted in full for the high frequency of important terms and concepts:

> εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ θεῖε, τί μοι ὀργίζῃ καὶ τί χαλεπὸν ὁρῶν οὕτω χαλεπῶς φέρεις; ἐνταῦθα δὴ ὁ Κυαξάρης ἀπεκρίνατο· ὅτι, ὦ Κῦρε, δοκῶν γε δὴ ἐφ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπων μνήμη ἐφικνεῖται καὶ τῶν πάλαι προγόνων καὶ πατρὸς βασιλέως πεφυκέναι καὶ αὐτὸς βασιλεὺς νομιζόμενος εἶναι, ἐμαυτὸν μὲν ὁρῶ οὕτω ταπεινῶς καὶ ἀναξίως ἐλαύνοντα, σὲ δὲ τῇ ἐμῇ θεραπείᾳ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ δυνάμει μέγαν τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ παρόντα.
>
> «In the name of all the gods, uncle», said he, «tell me why you are angry with me; and what do you find wrong that you take it so amiss?». «Because, Cyrus», Cyaxares

> then made answer, «while I am supposed to be the scion of a royal father and of a line of ancestors who were kings of old as far back as the memory of man extends, and while I am called a king myself, still I see myself riding along with a mean and unworthy equipage, while you come before me great and magnificent in the eyes of my own retinue as well as the rest of your forces» (trans. by W. Miller).

The cause of Cyaxares' anger lies in the fact that he, king, descendant of kings, sees himself bypassed and deprived of the honours due to him by Cyrus and his soldiers. With the necessary differences, Cyaxares feels belittled and dishonoured in relation to his role, not unlike Homeric Agamemnon, who, for the same reason, takes Briseis away from Achilles. On the contrary, Cyrus, in the continuation of his dialogue with Cyaxares, recalls a moment in which he avoided anger (5.5.21):

> ἐπεὶ δ' αὖ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐσίγα ὁ Κυαξάρης, ἀλλ' εἰ μηδὲ τοῦτο, ἔφη, βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, σὺ δὲ τοὐντεῦθεν λέγε εἴ τι αὖ ἠδίκουν ὅτι σοῦ ἀποκριναμένου ἐμοὶ ὡς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιο, εὐθυμουμένους ὁρῶν Μήδους, τούτου παύσας αὐτοὺς ἀναγκάζειν κινδυνεύσοντας ἰέναι, εἴ τι αὖ σοι δοκῶ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν ποιῆσαι ὅτι ἀμελήσας τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαί σοι ἐπὶ τούτοις πάλιν ᾔτουν σε οὗ ᾔδη οὔτε σοὶ μεῖον ὂν δοῦναι οὐδὲν οὔτε ῥᾷον Μήδοις ἐπιταχθῆναι· τὸν γὰρ βουλόμενον δήπου ἕπεσθαι ᾔτησά σε δοῦναί μοι.
>
> And as Cyaxares again said nothing, Cyrus resumed: «Well, seeing that you do not choose to answer that either, please tell me then if I did you wrong in the next step I took: when you answered that you saw that the Medes were enjoying themselves and that you would not be willing to disturb their pleasures and oblige them to go off into dangers, then, far from being angry with you for that, I asked you again for a favour than which, as I knew, nothing was less for you to grant or easier for you to require of the Medes: I asked you, as you will remember, to allow anyone who would to follow me. Was there anything unfair, think you, in that?» (trans. by W. Miller).

At the terminological level, one should note also in Xenophon the close correlation between the terms of the sphere of the ὀργή and the verb χαλεπαίνω. For reasons of space, I will limit myself to the occurrences in the *Cyropaedia*. In 3.1.38 the teacher of Tigranes' son exhorts him not to be angry with his father for condemning him to death: μήτι σύ, ἔφη, ὦ Τιγράνη, ὅτι ἀποκτείνει με, χαλεπανθῇς τῷ πατρί· οὐ γὰρ κακονοίᾳ τῇ σῇ τοῦτο ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀγνοίᾳ («Be not angry with your father, Tigranes, for putting me to death; for he does it, not from any spirit of malice, but from ignorance», trans. by W. Miller).[20] In 5.2.18 Gobrias observes the moderation (μετριότης) which characterises the behaviour of the Persians at the table: ἅ τε ἔπαιζον ὡς πολὺ μὲν ὕβρεως ἀπῆν, πολὺ δὲ τοῦ αἰσχρόν τι ποιεῖν, πολὺ δὲ τοῦ χαλεπαίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους

[20] On the context of the passage see Nicolai 2014.

(«he observed how far their jests were removed from insult, how far they were from doing anything unbecoming, and how far from offending one another», trans. by W. Miller). In the dialogue between Cyrus and Cyaxares the verb χαλεπαίνω appears with insistence (5.5.10-11):

> ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ὦ Κυαξάρη, οὔτε λέγεις ἀληθῆ οὔτε ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκεις, εἰ οἴει τῇ ἐμῇ παρουσίᾳ Μήδους κατεσκευάσθαι ὥστε ἱκανοὺς εἶναι σὲ κακῶς ποιεῖν· [11] τὸ μέντοι σε θυμοῦσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι οὐ θαυμάζω. εἰ μέντοι γε δικαίως ἢ ἀδίκως αὐτοῖς χαλεπαίνεις, παρήσω τοῦτο· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι βαρέως ἂν φέροις ἀκούων ἐμοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν· τὸ μέντοι ἄνδρα ἄρχοντα πᾶσιν ἅμα χαλεπαίνειν τοῖς ἀρχομένοις, τοῦτο ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ μέγα ἁμάρτημα εἶναι. ἀνάγκη γὰρ διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς μὲν φοβεῖν πολλοὺς ἐχθροὺς ποιεῖσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ πᾶσιν ἅμα χαλεπαίνειν πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμόνοιαν ἐμβάλλειν.
>
> «Well, Cyaxares, in this you do not speak truly nor do you judge correctly, if you think that by my presence the Medes have been put in a position to do you harm; [11] but that you are angered and threaten them gives me no surprise. However, whether your anger against them is just or unjust, I will not stop to inquire; for I know that you would be offended to hear me speak in their defence. To me, however, it seems a serious error for a ruler to be angry with all his subjects at the same time; for, as a matter of course, threatening many makes many enemies, and being angry with all at the same time inspires them all with a common sense of wrong» (trans. by W. Miller).

The formulation is not limited to the particular case but takes on a gnomic and general value in the final part of the passage. Finally, in 7.3.14 the verb χαλεπαίνω appears in the account of the story of Panthea: ἡ δὲ τροφὸς πολλὰ ἱκετεύουσα μὴ ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἤνυτε καὶ χαλεπαίνουσαν ἑώρα, ἐκάθητο κλαίουσα («The nurse, however, pleaded earnestly with her not to do so; but when her prayers proved of no avail and she saw her mistress becoming angered, she sat down and burst into tears», trans. by W. Miller). Panthea, however, did not listen to the nurse's pleas, but took up the sword and cut her throat.

In the *Hellenica* we find a reflection on anger of great importance, which looks like a concise version of *De ira*, but by Xenophon (5.3.7):[21]

> ἐκ μέντοι γε τῶν τοιούτων παθῶν ὡς ἐγώ φημι ἀνθρώπους παιδεύεσθαι μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐδ' οἰκέτας χρὴ ὀργῇ κολάζειν· πολλάκις γὰρ καὶ δεσπόται ὀργιζόμενοι μείζω κακὰ ἔπαθον ἢ ἐποίησαν· ἀτὰρ ἀντιπάλοις τὸ μετ' ὀργῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ γνώμῃ προσφέρεσθαι ὅλον ἁμάρτημα. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὀργὴ ἀπρονόητον, ἡ δὲ γνώμη σκοπεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον μή τι πάθῃ ἢ ὅπως βλάψῃ τι τοὺς πολεμίους.
>
> From such disasters, however, I hold that men are taught the lesson, chiefly, indeed, that they ought not to chastise anyone, even slaves, in anger – for masters

[21] The passage is rightly acknowledged by Tuci 2019, 26-27.

> in anger have often suffered greater harm than they have inflicted; but especially that, in dealing with enemies, to attack under the influence of anger and not with judgment is an absolute mistake. For anger is a thing which does not look ahead, while judgment aims no less to escape harm than to inflict it upon the enemy (trans. by C.L. Brownson).

The speaker is the author himself – a not very common circumstance in Xenophon – commenting on the defeat of the Spartans at Olinthus. Responsible for the defeat was Teleutias, who had succumbed to anger after a contingent of peltasts had been exterminated by the Olinthians (5.3.5): ὁ δὲ Τελευτίας ὡς εἶδε τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὀργισθεὶς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ ὅπλα ἦγε μὲν ταχὺ τοὺς ὁπλίτας, διώκειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐκέλευε καὶ ἀνιέναι («But Teleutias, filled with anger when he saw what was going on, snatched up his arms and led the hoplites swiftly forward, while he ordered the peltasts and the horsemen to pursue and not stop pursuing», trans. by C.L. Brownson). Xenophon's formulation is solemn and contains an explicit instruction (παιδεύεσθαι); anger is opposed to γνώμη and is defined as a ἁμάρτημα. The context is, of course, military, but the example of the punishment inflicted on the servants makes it clear that Xenophon is making more general considerations. Again a commander who, in anger, makes wrong decisions.

Other characters who let themselves be carried away by anger are Dercillidas (3.1.17), Agesilaus (3.4.4; 12; 6.5.5)[22] and Pharnabazus (4.8.6).

8. Ethical reflection and historical judgement

In the *Memorabilia*, the reflection on human tendencies towards friendship and, conversely, towards aggression is translated into a polar classification (2.6.21):

> ἀλλ' ἔχει μέν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλως πως ταῦτα, ὦ Κριτόβουλε. φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικά· δέονταί τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἐλεοῦσι καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις· τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τά τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος.

> Ah, Critobulus, but there is a strange complication in these matters. Some elements in man's nature make for friendship: men need one another, feel pity, work together for their common good, and, conscious of the facts, are grateful to one another. But there are hostile elements in men. For, holding the same things to be honourable and pleasant, they fight for them, fall out and take sides. Strife and

[22] On Agesilaus, see Tamiolaki 2012, 571-572, who rightly relates the behaviour of Agesilaus as depicted by Xenophon to the reflections of *Hell.* 5.3.7 (quoted above) and states that in the latter passage «Xenophon (perhaps unconsciously?) casts a shadow also on the portrait of Agesilaus as well» (the quotation is from p. 572).

anger lead to hostility, covetousness to enmity, jealousy to hatred (trans. by E.C. Marchant).

In this classification of feelings the terms of ethics recur, with a precise choice of field against the πολεμικά. Anger appears a little later, in the same context, among the negative feelings that are restrained by moderation (2.6.23):

δύνανται δὲ καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπεχόμενοι νομίμως κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις· δύνανται δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔριν οὐ μόνον ἀλύπως, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφερόντως ἀλλήλοις διατίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ μεταμελησόμενον προϊέναι· τὸν δὲ φθόνον παντάπασιν ἀφαιροῦσι, τὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νομίζοντες.

They can not only share wealth lawfully and keep from covetousness, but also supply one another's wants; they can compose strife not only without pain, but with advantage to one another, and prevent anger from pursuing its way towards remorse: but jealousy they take away utterly, regarding their own good things as belonging to their friends, and thinking their friend's good things to be their own (trans. by E.C. Marchant).

The concept of anger that then leads to repentance for actions committed under its effect recalls one of the observations on Clearchus's character (*An.* 2.6.9). In this case there is a coincidence between Socrates' teaching and a character trait observed by Xenophon in a real person, so to speak, *in corpore vivo*.

In *Mem.* 2.3.9 Socrates introduces a comparison between the patience one has towards a sheepdog and the impatience one feels towards a brother who does not behave well:

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· θαυμαστά γε λέγεις, ὦ Χαιρέκρατες, εἰ κύνα μέν, εἴ σοι ἦν ἐπὶ προβάτοις ἐπιτήδειος ὢν καὶ τοὺς μὲν ποιμένας ἡσπάζετο, σοὶ δὲ προσιόντι ἐχαλέπαινεν, ἀμελήσας ἂν τοῦ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπειρῶ εὖ ποιήσας πραΰνειν αὐτόν, τὸν δὲ ἀδελφὸν φὴς μὲν μέγα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ὄντα πρὸς σὲ οἷον δεῖ, ἐπίστασθαι δὲ ὁμολογῶν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ εὖ λέγειν οὐκ ἐπιχειρεῖς μηχανᾶσθαι ὅπως σοι ὡς βέλτιστος ᾖ.

Had you a sheep dog that was friendly to the shepherds, but growled when you came near him, it would never occur to you to get angry, but you would try to tame him by kindness. You say that, if your brother treated you like a brother, he would be a great blessing, and you confess that you know how to speak and act kindly: yet you don't set yourself to contriving that he shall be the greatest possible blessing to you (trans. by E.C. Marchant).

The tone of Socrates' discourse looks alike some evangelical parables, even though there is no religious motivation. A similar ethical approach can be

found in the story of the man who was angry because another did not return his greeting (3.13.1):

> ὀργιζομένου δέ ποτέ τινος, ὅτι προσειπών τινα χαίρειν οὐκ ἀντιπροσερρήθη, γελοῖον, ἔφη, τό, εἰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα κάκιον ἔχοντι ἀπήντησάς τῳ, μὴ ἂν ὀργίζεσθαι, ὅτι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγροικοτέρως διακειμένῳ περιέτυχες, τοῦτό σε λυπεῖ.
>
> On a man who was angry because his greeting was not returned: «Ridiculous!» he exclaimed; «you would not have been angry if you had met a man in worse health; and yet you are annoyed because you have come across someone with ruder manners!» (trans. by E.C. Marchant).

There is no shortage of examples in the *Memorabilia* of characters who are angry with Socrates, such as Charicles in 1.2.35 and the Thirty Tyrants in 1.2.38.

9. Man and horse

In *De re equestri* the parallelism between human behaviour and horse behaviour leads to very interesting considerations:[23]

> 9.2: πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν χρὴ τοῦτο γνῶναι, ὅτι ἐστὶ θυμὸς ἵππῳ ὅπερ ὀργὴ[24] ἀνθρώπῳ. ὥσπερ οὖν ἄνθρωπον ἥκιστ' ἂν ὀργίζοι τις ὁ μήτε λέγων χαλεπὸν μηδὲν μήτε ποιῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἵππον θυμοειδῆ ὁ μὴ ἀνιῶν ἥκιστ' ἐξοργίζοι.
>
> First, then, it must be realised that spirit in a horse is precisely what anger is in a man. Therefore, just as you are least likely to make a man angry if you neither say nor do anything disagreable to him, so he who abstains from annoying a spirited horse is least likely to rouse his anger (trans. by E.C. Marchant).
>
> 9.7: εἰ δέ τις οἴεται, ἢν ταχὺ καὶ πολλὰ ἐλαύνηται, ἀπειπεῖν ποιήσας τὸν ἵππον πραυνεῖν, τἀναντία γιγνώσκει τοῦ γιγνομένου. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὁ θυμοειδὴς καὶ ἄγειν βίᾳ μάλιστα ἐπιχειρεῖ καὶ σὺν τῇ ὀργῇ, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος ὀργίλος, πολλάκις καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὸν ἀναβάτην πολλὰ ἀνήκεστα ἐποίησεν.
>
> But if anyone supposes that he will calm a horse by frequent riding at a quick pace so as to tire him, his opinion is the opposite of the truth. For in such cases a spirited horse does his utmost to get the upper hand by force, and in his excitement, like an angry man, he often causes many irreparable injuries both to himself and to his rider (trans. by E.C. Marchant).

[23] On the animal similes applied to wrath in Seneca's *De ira* see Berno 2021. On *De ira* see Monteleone 2014.

[24] The comparison between the θυμός of humans and the behaviour of animals is present in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 3, 1116b23 ff.

In these passages the use of the term θυμός and its derivative θυμοειδής, which totally match with ὀργή in the human sphere (but not only: see σὺν τῇ ὀργῇ, referring to the horse in 9.7), is noteworthy.

10. Concluding remarks

Before drawing conclusions from our analysis, a premise is necessary: from the ancient passages discussed we have noticed how, even in the same translation, the same terms can be translated differently. The difficulty of translation is well-known, as the translator tries to shape the Greek in a refined way, yet these differences allow us to understand how ancient and modern categories in the field of emotions differ from one another.

In Thucydides the focus lies on the behaviour of the masses, on how to control or direct it: there are frequent cases in which the inhabitants of a city or the soldiers of an army make decisions or behave led by anger. The manifestations of anger displayed by a single individual are rare. In some cases, as in Pausanias' (1.130.2), they lead to serious consequences. The frequency with which Thucydides' orators reflect and make their internal audience (and Thucydides' readers) reflect upon the anger of the masses is a clear sign of the importance of this issue in the political debate of the last thirty years of the fifth century. Among the virtues of the Athenians there was their ability to keep anger under control, at least in relations between citizens and in exceptional situations, recalling as an *exemplum* such as the one that led to the battle of Salamis. On closer inspection though the two cases fall within the strategies used in the genre of the *logos epitaphios*. The first passage is in Pericles' epitaph (2.37.2), the second (1.74.2) is an *exemplum* found in all the epitaphs that give space to the Athenians' exploits as it is the Athenians' behaviour at the battle of Salamis. This means that these statements are appropriate to the 'intentional history' of the epitaphs and, thus, that they are not objective representations of the Athenians' behaviour. Moreover, Pericles' epitaph is a condensation of Periclean ideology as seen by Thucydides and for this reason is a particularly difficult text to handle.

In Xenophon, anger is frequently mentioned as a trigger for conflict. Commanders are often dealing with anger, but there are also cases of anger involving a whole community, for example the Spartans. In many cases, also soldiers are angry, both as a community and as individuals. On the one hand, Xenophon observes the emotional impulses of the masses, which are dangerous because they can get out of hand: the historian thus shows the usual aristocratic contempt for the crowd. On the other hand, he emphasises the need for commanders to be able to control and guide aggressive impulses for the good of everyone. When commanders or sovereigns let themselves be carried away by anger, they are characters who do not represent fully or at all the ideal figure that Xenophon has in mind: Clearchus, Cyaxares, Teleutias. If Achilles' anger in Homer derives from a breach of reciprocity and is therefore an individual feeling that involves society, imposing reparation or

revenge, in Xenophon anger is never presented positively or even neutrally: anger represents a danger not only for the individual, but also for the collective dimension, if the individual has command responsibilities. In one of the rare authorial interventions in the *Hellenica* (5.3.7), anger is contrasted with γνώμη, thanks to which one can analyse the consequences of one's actions. The comparison between the θυμός of the horse and the anger of the man (*De re eq.* 9.2) leads to a physiological conception of the *psyche*, with anger being part of the, so to speak, animal component of man, as opposed to the intellectual part, the γνώμη of *Hell.* 5.3.7.

The fact that Xenophon proposes models of behaviour that are ideal (Cyrus the Great, Xenophon himself) and less ideal (Clearchus) or far from ideal (Cyaxares) leads us to consider the distance from the paradigms proposed by Homer and on Xenophon's own intentions. It proves evident that Homer's paradigms[25] are no longer felt as appropriate by Xenophon, who is in good company in this attitude: with different positions, Thucydides, Isocrates and Plato also distance themselves from Homer, who is no longer considered the educator of the Greeks.[26] As a consequence, they present, explicitly (Plato, partly Isocrates)[27] or implicitly (Thucydides, Xenophon), new paradigms. This happens both in terms of the paradigms and values proposed and in terms of literary form: all these authors create literary genres and strategies appropriate to the new functions they attribute to their works. If we go deeper, we can observe that the anger of Cyaxares in the *Ciropaedia* is not comparable to that of Achilles, provoked by the violation of reciprocity and the devaluation of his τιμή, but rather to that of Agamemnon, who, as commander-in-chief, does not accept losing Chryseides and demands an appropriate share of the spoils. But not even the anger of Achilles could be justified by Xenophon: the only acceptable circumstance is when anger, in case of danger, compels to action. This is what happens when Cyrus the Younger forces even the aristocrats in his retinue to pull their chariots out of the mud and when Cyrus the Great takes issue with the laxity of the Chaldean soldiers, or when Xenophon beats the soldier who was about to bury a dying man alive (*An.* 5.8.8-11).

The picture I have tried to draw confirms the centrality of the debate on education between the fifth and fourth centuries BC and the profound revolution occuring in the crucial decades from the Peloponnesian War to Chaeronea. The classification of human feelings into friendly and aggressive in *Mem.* 2.6.21 places anger within the latter, which is determined by the desire for domination and by envy. With Xenophon's Socrates anger becomes, if not a capital sin, a feeling to be stigmatised, especially in those in power.

[25] On the representation of anger in the Homeric poems, in addition to Nicolai, in press, I refer to Muellner 1996; Finkelberg 1998; Walsh 2005; Konstan 2006; Cairns 2007; Most 2007; Katz Anhalt 2017.

[26] See, among others, Verdenius 1970.

[27] On Isocrates I refer to Nicolai 2004. See in particular *Panath.* 263 with Nicolai 2004, 94.

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