Is There a Non-Skeptical Alternative to Cognitivism? Regarding “¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?” by Pierluigi Chiassoni
This paper discusses the work “¿Interpretación jurídica sin verdad?” by Pierluigi Chiassoni, in which he raises the question of whether there is room for truth in the field of legal interpretation and in which he expressly defends the following theses: (1) empirical truth is not predictable from the result of interpretative activity (in its proper sense and practical function) and (2) cognitivism is a misconception regarding the nature of judicial interpretative activity. The criticisms presented in this paper are not so much with respect to these two theses (which are shared), but with respect to the methodological apparatus that Chiassoni develops to defend his theses, from which he seems to want to draw some consequences. The fundamental discrepancies presented here with Chiassoni’s theses concern his conception of Law as a system of norms (or provisions and norms) and practical rationality as purely instrumental rationality, which would be the deep presuppositions on which his construction rests.
Copyrights are transferred for five years starting publication date from the author(s) to the Publisher. After this period, the content is released under a Creative Commons licence (Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International).