Second Replies to Criticisms on <em>Teoría analítica del derecho</em>

Abstract

This paper is a second response to critical comments on my book Teoría Analítica del Derecho (hereinafter TAD). Miguel Fernández Núñez has commented on the rational reconstruction of rights offered in the book; Alejandro Calzetta and Julieta Rabanos have directed objections to my disqualification of the notion of constitutive rules and to my reconstruction of power conferring norms; Sebastián Agüero-San Juan and Lorena Ramírez-Ludeña have pointed out questions about the relationship between my conception of norms and my defense of a partial indeterminist thesis regarding legal interpretation; Alessio Sardo highlighted the links between Originalism and Legal Positivism, and Cristina Redondo has disputed some of my theses on universalism, defeasibility, and normative conflicts. In the text I reflect on their ideas and try to answer some of their criticisms and remarks.